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I. Introduction 
The existence of an immigrant gap in education (difference in scores between immigrants 
and natives) is widely acknowledged, but its causes remain unclear. While several studies have 
analysed the performance of immigrant students in individual countries and in groups of countries 
in relation to family background (Schneeweiss, 2009; Ammermueller, 2007b; Entorf, and Minoiu, 
2005; Entorf and Tatsi, 2009; OECD, 2006), the possible links between the immigrant school gaps 
and the structural features of countries’ educational institutions have received less attention (Entorf 
and Lauk, 2006; Schnepf, 2007). The implications of a gap in education are, however, well 
understood: they mainly consist of opportunity disparities for the individuals in their adult lives, 
especially in labour markets (Dustmann, 2004). 
Some features of the educational institutions of countries differ, but in most cases they are 
based on one of two main models: tracking or comprehensive. In the former, students are 
channelled into schools with different programmes, academic and vocational, with vocational 
schools ranked below academic ones in terms of quality, programme content and students’ 
prospects of pursuing further studies at the tertiary level. In the comprehensive model, all students 
follow the same programme throughout the compulsory schooling cycle. 
The relationships between individual performances and schooling models have been more 
extensively investigated in studies concerning the overall population of students. Several authors 
find a lower dispersion of scores where schooling is comprehensive, and interpret this finding as an 
indication that this model of education is fairer than tracking (Schuetz et al., 2008; Brunello and 
Checchi, 2007; Wömann, 2004; Ammermueller, 2007a; Hanushek and Wömann, 2006; Bauer and 
Riphahn, 2006; Raitano and Vona, 2010). A further implication is that the school performance of 
minorities is perhaps not independent of the educational models of countries and, more specifically, 
that the immigrant school gaps (negative and positive) can be expected to be narrower where 
schooling is comprehensive.   
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The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationships  between the school gap of 
immigrant students and the educational models of receiving countries. It is based on data from PISA 
2006, which focuses on science. Of the 57 countries or jurisdictions that participated to PISA 2006, 
it takes into account the 29 countries with a highest proportions of immigrant students. Similarly to 
previous investigations on this issue, we consider the educational systems of countries together with 
several indicators of individual characteristics and background (Entorf and Lauk, 2006; Schnepf, 
2007). Contrary to previous papers, however,  we take into account a large number of countries, we  
measure the relationship between scores and school types at the individual rather than at the 
aggregate – country – level and, also, we separately analyse the impact on immigrant gaps of 
educational systems and of the individual schools attended by students. 
Partially confirming prior expectations, we find that  the structural features of educational 
systems matter: – controlling for individual characteristics and family background - negative gaps 
are wider in countries with sharp tracking and narrower – with some exceptions - where schools are 
comprehensive. Where tracking is sharp, the poorer performance of immigrants compared to that of 
natives tends to be strongly related to the types of school attended. Our results only partially 
confirm expectations because gaps are negative and significant also in a reduced number countries 
with comprehensive schools. These countries, together with those characterized by sharp tracking, 
are located in continental Western Europe. Hence, among the countries considered in this paper, 
those with the most negative and significant school gaps are concentrated in this area.  
A further finding is that in several countries of continental Western Europe the poorer 
performance of immigrant students relatively to that of natives is related not only to school tracking, 
where present in its sharpest form, but also to the specific schools attended by each group – which 
could signal residential segregation – and in some cases remains significant within schools – which 
in turn may be a symptom of discrimination.     
A different possible explanation for this concentration of negative gaps is that they might 
depend on characteristics of the immigrant communities residing in Western Europe. For example, 
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the importance attached to education may vary between ethnic groups, and  immigrant groups in 
Europe might assign a lower value to schooling than immigrant populations in other areas of the 
world. To control for this possibility, we add the countries or world areas of origin of immigrant 
students and their parents to the base regressions. We do not find, however, a significant 
concentration of negative coefficients of the ‘country of origin’ variable in European countries and, 
hence, an empirical support for this possibility. 
One more disaggregated indicator of assimilation in education concerns the performance of 
different generations of immigrant students. As second generation immigrants attend the entire 
school cycle in the country of residence and their families have been living there for a longer time, 
it is generally expected that, controlling for relevant factors,  they will perform more similarly to 
natives than first generation ones (Schneeweiss, 2009; Schnepf, 2007). This paper measures the 
performance of first and second generation immigrant students separately. 
One variable of special interest for our investigation is the speaking of a foreign language at 
home. Some authors find that a negative correlation between speaking a foreign language at home 
and scores at school is especially present in English-speaking countries (Schnepf, 2007; Fertig and 
Schmidt, 2002; Entorf and Lauk, 2006). Our findings only partially confirm these results.   
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents some basic traits of the educational 
models; Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy; Section 4 analyses the results and 
Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Educational systems  
While the two main schooling models are tracking and comprehensive, their effective 
implementation differs across countries. The age at which the type of school is selected varies from 
ten years old in some cases to sixteen in others. We include in our definition of tracking those 
countries where school selection takes place before sixteen years old. Among these, the number of 
tracks may be two or more, and, more importantly, the differentiation between them may be mild or 
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sharp. Tracking is particularly sharp in some continental Western European countries, where the 
quality of academic and vocational schools differs substantially and the choice of school takes place 
at an early age (Wömann, 2009).   
Similarly, comprehensive systems differ in the degree of uniformity with which the common 
school programme is taught within schools. In some countries, especially European ones, courses 
are taught to all students at the same level of difficulty, while in others, mostly English-speaking, 
core courses are taught at different levels, which can be either chosen by students or accessed 
through examination. This type of schooling is often denominated comprehensive with “streaming”.    
The proportion of students in grades below the average for their age is of interest for our 
investigation because it can relate in particular to immigrants. For the sake of brevity, students in 
below average grades will be defined as “repeaters”, even though not all of them are actually 
repeating a school year. Grade repetition is related to educational customs rather than institutional 
rules and varies significantly across countries. Table 1 depicts the countries included in this study 
(selected as explained in Section 3) and shows that, with a few exceptions, grade repetition is 
common in continental Europe, especially where tracking is sharp but also in some countries with 
comprehensive schools, such as Spain, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia. On the other hand, it is less 
common elsewhere; it is rare especially among English-speaking countries (which all have 
comprehensive systems, except for Ireland, where school selection takes place at fifteen).   
 
3. Data and econometric specification 
3.1. Data 
The distribution of the educational attainments of the adult population of immigrants and overall in 
the set of countries considered is summarized in Table 2. Columns (1) and (3) show the proportions 
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of people aged 25 and over with primary education and who have completed at least one year of 
tertiary studies (secondary education being the difference between the two).1   
The figures in the Table clearly show that immigrants tend to be concentrated in the lower 
and higher tails of the distribution for  educational level. Immigrants with tertiary education are 
more frequent in English-speaking countries and those with primary education in Central and 
Southern Western Europe, but the differences in education between them and the countries’ overall 
populations, which interest us more because of their possible relationship with students’ gaps at 
school, are more substantial outside continental Europe.  In Canada these differences are wider for 
both  primary and tertiary levels, in USA and Australia for the primary level, and in Great Britain 
for the tertiary level (columns 5 and 6 of Table 2).  
In this paper we use the data provided by the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), an internationally standardized evaluation conducted every three years in a 
large number of countries. Its main purpose is to collect data on the competencies of 15-year-old 
students in reading, mathematics and science. The data were collected during the third PISA survey, 
in 2006, which includes 57 countries or jurisdictions and focuses on science. The 29 countries 
selected for this study are those where immigrant students account for at least 3% of the student 
population. The same criterion was adopted in OECD (2006), based on PISA 2003.2  
The PISA student questionnaire includes an indicator (ISCEDO) of general, pre-vocational 
and vocational schools, but figures are missing or unreliable for several countries. We therefore 
used the UNESCO (2006) classification of educational systems to build a proxy of the “school 
type” variable. More precisely, we divided the schools of each country into three main categories, 
                                                 
1 Data on the educational attainment of the adult population in countries,  not available for all the countries considered, 
are from Barro-Lee (2000) updated to 2007, and on the educational attainment of  adult immigrants are from Docquier 
and Marfouk (2006). 
2 The 3% condition holds only for the second-generation student population in Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia, and for 
first generation ones in Greece, Ireland, Montenegro, and Italy. First-generation students: born outside the country of 
assessment, with parents born in a different country; second-generation students: born in the country of assessment, 
with parents born in a different country. 
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i.e., type 1: academic, type 2: intermediate, and type 3: vocational.3 We then linked this 
classification to the variable (PROGN) of the student database indicating the school attended by 
each student, and obtained, as a result, a proxy of school types at the micro level (details from the 
authors upon request). This differs from previous studies of educational systems, where school 
models are considered at the aggregate country level (Schuetz et al., 2008; Brunello and Checchi, 
2007; Wömann, 2004; Ammermueller, 2007a; Hanushek and Wömann, 2006; Bauer and Riphahn, 
2006). 
Table 3 contains the values of an index of “specialization” of immigrants with respect to 
natives in each school type and grade. Index numbers are the ratio between the proportion of 
immigrant students in a given school type or grade and the proportion of native students in that 
school type or grade. Values above unity denote the relative specialization of immigrant students. 
The last column indicates the average grade for fifteen-year-olds in each country. Indices for 
Switzerland are biased in favour of type-1 schools because substantial numbers of students move to 
the country just for educational purposes, and mainly attend schools of type 1.  
Several numbers above unity in Table 3 concern countries - such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland, Italy and France - where tracking is 
sharp and repeaters are frequent even among the overall student population. Among countries with 
comprehensive schools, there is a relative specialization of immigrants in the lower grades in 
Denmark, Spain, Hong Kong and Macao. It is also worth noting that index numbers are often, but 
not always, higher for first-generation immigrants.  
 
3.2  Econometric specification 
First, we consider a regression model for each country, where the only regressor is the immigrant 
status of students and the dependent variable is students’ scores . The regression equation is:  
                                                 
3 “Special schools” – schools for children with special needs – were included in type 3; within our sample, they are 
present only in countries with tracking. 
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Yis  =  β0   +  βI Iis +   εis                                                                     (1) 
 
where Y are the scores of student i in school s; Iis is a categorical variable denoting whether the  
student is native or first or second generation immigrant. The native status is in the intercept, and βI, 
the difference in performance between immigrants and natives, is the immigrant student gap, the 
coefficient of interest to us. 4 Usual assumptions on εis apply.  
This first step is useful in providing a preliminary picture of the distribution of raw gaps 
across countries. At a glance it can show whether the resulting distribution is similar to that for the 
differences between the educational attainments of countries’ immigrant and overall adult 
populations, seen in Table 2, or, also, whether it relates to the differences in educational systems 
(Table 1).   
While this first group of regressions measures the unconditional coefficients, the other 
groups of variables are added in subsequent steps. This procedure helps to make the influence of the 
different factors on the immigrant gap, i.e. on the coefficient I, clear.  
Next, we consider an augmented regression model by adding the factors concerning 
schooling: grades and school types. The purpose of this second model is to see whether schooling 
affects the  immigrant gaps in countries. The regression equation is now   
 
Yis  =  β0   +  βI Iis +  βs Sis +  βG Gis +  εis                                         (2) 
                               
type of school and grade are, respectively, Sis and Gis, and βS and βG are their coefficients.  
Gaps are expected to shrink more where immigrants are present above all in the lower 
grades (Table 3) and, within the group of countries with tracking, where the differentiation between 
                                                 
4 First-generation students:  born outside the country of assessment, parents also born in a different country;   second-
generation students: born in the country of assessment, parents born in a different country. 
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curricula is sharp (Table 1). The results of this second group of regressions are still only indicative 
because important variables – concerning background and students’ characteristics - are missing 
and could be correlated with the regressors, grades and school types. If they are, the school types 
and grades coefficients will capture both the direct correlation between the schooling and scores and 
the indirect ones concerning background. This will presumably lead to an upward bias in absolute 
value of the immigrant gap, which should be corrected in the subsequent, more complete, models.5  
The third step leads to a more complete specification, which includes the gender of students, 
the parents’ levels of education and employment status and the language spoken at home:  
 
Yis  =  β0  +  βI Iis +  βs Sis +  βG Gis +  βX Xis  +  εis ,                                (3) 
 
where Xis is a vector of background variables and βX is the vector of coefficients (A list of variables 
is Table A). 
In countries where the schooling coefficients already capture a high proportion  of 
background factors, the further inclusion of the Xis variables is not expected to substantially affect 
the immigrant gaps and the R2 of the regressions. Conversely, where background is related to scores 
directly rather than through school types or grades, gaps should shrink and R2 should increase 
substantially.  
There is also expected to be a group of countries where both schooling and family 
background are weakly correlated with students’ scores. This type of result has been interpreted as 
indicating a fairer educational system, because performance might, in fact, be linked more to 
unmeasurable factors, such as innate talent (Wömann, 2004). For the topic under investigation in 
this paper, it is interesting to see whether the weak correlations and system fairness concern all 
students, including immigrants, or especially natives.  
                                                 
5 The βI would be negatively biased if, for example, students of the poorer families were overrepresented in vocational 
and technical schools and immigrants have, on average, a poorer background than natives.  
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More generally, the gaps that remain after controlling for schooling and background are 
informative. They signal that other factors, not explicitly considered in the model, may help to 
explain the different performance of the two groups of students. For example, the performance of 
the two can systematically differ between schools, or within them. To assess the importance of 
these forces, a different specification of the model, with added school fixed effects (and school 
types excluded), is regressed.  The equations now are:  
 
Yis  =    βI Iis +  βG Gis +  βX Xis  + s +  εis                                                    (4) 
 
where s are the school fixed effects. A contraction of the gaps with respect to equation (3) suggests 
a differentiation between the schools taken individually (not the school types) attended by the two 
groups, while gaps that remain wide and significant signal a differentiation in scores within schools.  
Equations (3) and (4) control for family background, but scores may also depend on cultural 
patterns related to ethnicity and the country of origin of students and their families.  The possible 
influence of these factors is controlled for in a further set of regressions: the countries or world 
areas of origin of the student and their mother and father are added to equation (3).  For reasons of 
brevity, the results of these regressions are not presented in this paper, but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
Regarding the assimilation of students into education, it is generally expected that, taking 
into account the main differences between immigrant cohorts, second generation immigrant 
students will perform more similarly to natives than first generation ones. In the regressions of this 
paper, most differences between cohorts should be accounted for by the variables concerning 
student and family characteristics (and country of origin). Hence, we expect the scores of second 
generation immigrants to be more similar to those of natives than the scores of first generation ones 
both for countries with negative and positive gaps, and for countries with tracking and 
comprehensive schools.   
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The level of R2 in each set of regressions and its variability between countries is also of 
interest.  The value resulting from the first set of regressions, based on the specification of equation 
(1), will reveal the proportion of the total variability explained by students’ immigrant status alone 
in each country. Compared to this value, the R2 of the second specification, of equation (2), can be 
expected to increase more for countries with  a marked stratification of the educational system, due 
either to sharp tracking or, also, to a high frequency of grade repetition. Higher values of R2 in 
equation (3) indicate that scores are substantially related to the factors measured, such as schooling 
and background. A further increase with the specification of equation (4) shows that the specific 
school attended helps to explain the gap. 
In general, if the values of a coefficient in regressions resulting from different specifications 
of a base model are to be compared,  all the regressions should be run with the same, or a very 
similar, number of observations. In our case, the comparisons concern our coefficient of interest, I. 
Tables 4a and 4b (columns 8 and 16) below, show that the number of missing observations is very 
similar or equal for Models I and II and for Models III and IV (based, respectively, on equations 1-2 
and 3-4). Also, except in the case of Germany, missing entries are low in Models I and II,  and 
higher in Models III and IV.  
In this analysis, we avoid imputing missing values and choose to eliminate observations 
with missing entries. We avoid imputation for two main reasons. One is that standard estimators, 
such as OLS, applied to imputed data may have substantial biases (Rubin, 2008) and even more 
sophisticated, likelihood-based, computational approaches, such as the EM algorithm with 
nontrivial assumptions about the process generating the missing data, may lead to biased estimators. 
The other is that, as stated, for the majority of countries the number of missing observations, 
especially in Models I and II, is low.   
Regressions have been run by using weighted OLS. To be more specific,  balanced repeated 
replications (BRRs) (e.g. see Särndal et al., 1992), based on the weights provided in the PISA 
dataset, have been  used for computing model parameter estimates and their standard errors OECD 
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(2009). BRR is a method of estimating the sampling variability of a statistic that takes the properties 
of the sampling design into account. Like the Jacknife and Bootstrap methods, it uses re-sampling 
principles and provides unbiased estimates of the sampling error arising from complex sample 
selection procedures. For our data, BBR accounts for the two-stage sample design for selection of 
schools and students within schools (see OECD, 2009). In particular, PISA provides a set of 80 
alternative weights that have to be assigned to each student to form alternative samples at the 
country level. The confidence intervals for the inferences reported in Tables 4 are standard (1-)% 
confidence intervals (<0.05) based on the asymptotic normality assumption of the coefficient 
estimates. We performed diagnostic analysis on the BBR coefficient estimate replicates to confirm 
that this assumption is trustworthy for all the reported results.    
 
4. Results 
Tables 4a and 4b depict the immigrant student gaps of the countries considered. Model I provides 
the results of unconditional gaps, of equation (1) of Section 3.2 above. As expected, the findings are 
that immigrants perform significantly below natives in the majority of countries, and above natives 
only in a small number of cases. The extent of the gaps becomes clear if we consider that PISA 
scores across OECD countries are standardized to an average of 500 with an international standard 
deviation of 100, and that a school year  has been found to correspond to about a third of the 
standard deviation (Schuetz et al., 2008). Hence, in countries such as Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark or Sweden, immigrants lag behind natives by as much as two or three school 
years, while in others, such as Australia, Canada, Ireland or Qatar, the difference is small or even 
positive.  
At a glance, in Model I of Tables 4a and 4b, the distribution of the unconditional gaps across 
countries seems to be unrelated to either the two main school systems (Table 1), comprehensive and 
tracking, or the differences between the educational attainments of the adult populations of 
immigrants and overall in the countries of residence (Table 2). What the figures do clearly show is 
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that negative school gaps are wider in continental Western Europe, where both educational systems 
are present, and where differences in educational attainments are not wider than elsewhere. In 
particular, immigrants perform substantially below natives in countries where education is based on 
tracking (for first generation immigrants, in Austria: - 92.3, Belgium: - 93.2, Switzerland: -94.8, 
Germany -92.8, Luxembourg: -66.9, France: -66.9, Italy: 61.1 and Portugal: 66.9) as well as where 
it is comprehensive (Denmark: -88.6, Norway: -59.6, Sweden: -78.1 and Spain: -65.7).  
However, these gaps are unconditional, and the educational attainments in Table 2 refer to 
adult populations. A clearer picture emerges from the consideration of the gaps in Model II of 
Tables 4a and 4b (equation 2 above), where the educational variables concerning grades and school 
types are added to the initial regression model.  
The prior expectation was that school types and grades would have a stronger impact in 
countries with tracking, both because the school types regressor is present only for these countries 
and because it can be correlated with the missing variables concerning family background. It was 
hypothesised in Section 3.2 that this might lead to an upward bias in absolute value. The results in 
Tables 4a and 4 partially confirm the expectation that negative and significant gaps are wider in 
countries with sharp tracking, and – with some exceptions - narrower in those with comprehensive 
schools. They also show that for both educational models the most negative gaps are of countries 
located – except for Estonia - in continental Western Europe.  
Therefore there is also a significant heterogeneity within each group of countries. The # sign 
in column 7 of Tables 4a and 4b indicates that the difference between the coefficients of Models I 
and II is significant at the 1% level (of either first or second generation immigrants) in eight of the 
fifteen countries with tracking, but also in three of the fourteen countries with comprehensive 
schools.6 Among the latter, the gap is affected by the introduction of the grades regressor. 
 Among countries with tracking, the impact of school types and grades on the immigrant 
gaps is, as expected, higher where the differentiation between school types is sharper and the 
                                                 
6 Difference between coefficients are measured following Allison (1995). 
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immigrants repeat grades more frequently than natives (Model II of Table 4a). Gaps shrink by about 
two school years in Belgium (from -93.2 to -36.6), by one and a half in Italy (from -61.1 to - 12.9), 
and by about one in Germany (from -76.7 to -46), France (from -66.8 to -35.4) and the Netherlands 
(from -67.5 to - 30.3). In the other countries with tracking, either the impact of the school variables 
is low or gaps were already narrow in Model I.  
Among countries with comprehensive schools, the grades variable ‘explains’ a significant 
part of the immigrant gap where the rates of grades repetition are high and immigrants are 
overrepresented in the lower grades (Tables 1 and 3 above). The coefficient of first generation 
immigrants shrinks by amounts corresponding to about one school year, from -65.7 to -37.7 in 
Spain, from -88.6 to -75.8 in Denmark, and, atypically, increases in absolute value in Estonia, from 
-31.9 to -38.3, suggesting a lower performance of immigrants within grades. 
Hence, Model II shows that the negative gaps of immigrants are significantly related to 
schooling especially in a ‘core’ group of countries, located in continental Western Europe and 
characterized by sharp tracking or frequent grade repetition. Outside this area, the school 
performance of immigrants is more similar to that of natives or, where gaps are wider, as in Great 
Britain or the United States, they are related to other factors.   
What are the effects of introducing background into this picture? Model III show that the 
consideration of the parents’ level of education and occupation and the language spoken at home 
brings differentiated findings. On the one hand, relatively to Model II, the proportion of explained 
variation of the regressions tends to increase relatively more in comprehensive countries. This could 
be expected, given that the R2 of comprehensive countries in Model II were generally lower. On the 
other hand, gaps shrink further with respect to Model II in some countries with tracking but 
especially in those with comprehensive schools.  
In countries with tracking, the introduction of the background variables affects the gap, 
especially where it remained wide and significant in Model II: Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia. One country where, in contrast, schooling variables appear 
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to capture most of the factors underlying the different performance of natives and immigrants is 
Italy: here the gap already shrinks by about one and a half school years in Model II and no further 
substantial effect is registered in the more complete Model III. 7 
Gaps also shrink where schools are comprehensive. One interesting finding is that gaps in 
English-speaking countries (which are all comprehensive, except for Ireland, where choice is at 
fifteen) are low or nil even unconditional, with the exception of the USA and Great Britain, where 
negative coefficients in Models I and II correspond to approximately one school year. In Model III 
all countries in this group are characterised by similar school performances of immigrant and native 
students. This implies that gaps, where present, are due mostly to different family backgrounds.   
This more complete specification, however, does still not entirely explain the different 
performance of native and immigrant students everywhere. Some negative and significant 
differences remain, with coefficients corresponding to one or almost one school year, in several 
countries of continental Europe, both with the tracking and the comprehensive school models: 
among the former, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France 
(Table 4a, Model III), among the latter,  Denmark, Sweden, Estonia and Spain (Table 4b, Model 
III). 
These remaining gaps suggest that forces not considered in the model may be at work. For 
example, the difference in performance could be due to immigrants and natives mainly attending 
different schools, or it could take place within schools. To distinguish between these possibilities, 
Model IV includes school fixed effects in the full model, and excludes the school type variable.  
Results of Model IV show that the coefficients of second generation immigrant students in 
Germany, Switzerland, France and Luxembourg become non-significant, which indicates a 
variation between schools, i.e. second generation immigrants in these countries tend to attend 
                                                 
7 Coefficients of Models II and III cannot be strictly compared for this country, as the number of observations differs 
substantially in the two specifications. However, the shrinking of the immigrant coefficient is already considerable  in 
Model II, where the proportion of missing observations is just 2%. Regressions on the interactions between background 
and schooling variables (available from the authors upon request) show that the performance of students in this country 
is significantly  related to background through the indirect school type and grades channels. On Italy and Germany see 
also Checchi and Flabbi (2007). 
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schools with a lower quality of education than those attended by natives. The finding refers to 
schools taken individually, but considered together with the significant coefficients in Model III, it 
shows that, for given background factors, the poorer performance of these students is correlated 
both with the types of school– vocational and technical rather than academic – and with the specific 
schools attended. This result may be due to factors such as residential segregation. The variation 
between schools finding also applies to Estonia, where, in contrast with the above countries, the 
school system is comprehensive. There educational quality only differs between schools taken 
individually, and not also between school types.  
Conversely, gaps remain negative and significant even with the school fixed effect in 
countries of Northern  Europe: Sweden (-40.3 first generation, -18.1 second), the Netherlands (-14.6 
first, -25.7 second), Denmark (-28, first), Austria (-31.3, first), and in Spain (-32.9). The result 
concerns both school systems and denotes differences within schools that may be due to 
discrimination. Outside Europe, negative gaps remain significant only in Israel (and there only for 
second generation immigrant students, while for first generation ones they are positive).   
We are also interested in the performance of first and second generation immigrants. The 
prior expectation is that, controlling for other factors, the latter should perform more similarly to 
natives than first generation students because they have been brought up  in their country  of 
residence. However, for the group of European countries with tracking especially,  the results of our 
regressions show a different picture. In Model I, the unconditional gaps of second generation 
immigrants are as negative as those of the first generation cohort in Austria, Belgium, Germany 
(corresponding to almost three school years), the Netherlands, Switzerland and Luxembourg 
(corresponding to two or more school years). In comprehensive countries, a similar result applies to 
Denmark and Sweden (with gaps corresponding to more than one school year). 
More generally, the performance of second generation immigrants is not as expected in 
several countries of Northern and central Western Europe. In this area, after controlling for family 
background and hence for variables that can account for differences between cohorts, second 
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generation immigrant students do not perform better than first generation ones. Depending on each 
country, the poor performance is related to the school types or to the specific schools attended, to 
differences within schools or to all these factors.  
Does the language spoken at home matter? Our results show that it affects scores in some 
countries, but, contrasting with the findings from  previous work (Schnepf, 2007; Fertig and 
Schmidt, 2002; Entorf and Lauk, 2006), not especially in English-speaking ones. As shown in 
column 17 of Tables 4a and 4b, speaking a foreign language at home is significantly correlated with 
scores in the full regressions (not reported in this paper, but available from the authors upon 
request), with a negative sign in Australia, Canada and Ireland (where gaps are narrow), but also in 
the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Russia, and Hong Kong.  
Interestingly, the R2 of the regressions for countries with tracking and for those with 
comprehensive education tend to differ. Even in Models I and IV, where the specifications are 
identical for the two groups, the R2 values are generally higher in the group of countries with 
tracking (Tables 4a and 4b). In Model I, immigrant status alone explains about the 10% of the total 
variation in regressions for countries with tracking, such as Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Germany and Luxembourg and about 5% in the Netherlands (Table 4a), while its value is nil or near 
to zero in most countries with comprehensive schools, with the exception of Denmark and Sweden, 
where the value of  R2  is about 0.05 (Table 4b). In the more complete Model IV, the values of the 
R2 of several countries with tracking, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia, are above 0.5 (in some cases, this already 
occurs in Model II), while the  R2 values of countries with comprehensive schools, with the sole 
exception of Qatar (where immigrant school gaps  are positive), are well below that level.  
As already stated, lower values of R2 have been interpreted as evidence of a stronger 
relationship between performance and unmeasurable factors like innate talent and hence of fairer 
educational systems. Our results concerning Sweden, Denmark and Estonia, in Northern Europe, 
show a more complete picture, where R2 values are low but negative immigrant school gaps are 
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wide and significant, which suggests a fairness of educational institutions that concerns the majority 
of students, but not immigrants, or at least not to the same extent. Conversely English-speaking 
countries are characterized by both low R2 and narrow immigrant student gaps (for the USA and 
UK, the latter result applies after controlling for background).  
Further studies can make clear whether this difference between the two groups of countries 
with comprehensive schooling arises mainly because of the way the model is effectively 
implemented in each case or because of other factors, which may concern the integration of 
immigrant communities into society in more general terms. Regarding the first point, the 
comprehensive model with streaming, more characteristic of English speaking countries, provides 
students with the possibility of taking courses at different levels of difficulty, which can be 
important for those with some disadvantages in specific disciplines, but not in others. Especially 
when the disadvantage in some disciplines is due to cultural reasons, or to a dissimilarity in study 
programmes compared to the country of origin, the immigrant student can compensate with other 
disciplines, and, with time, aim to achieve convergence with average scores in all subjects. This 
convergence is more difficult in countries where the programme of study is the same for all 
students, and an initial disadvantage in one subject can simply grow with the passage of time. 
 The higher concentration of negative scores in the European area, however, could be related 
to characteristics of the immigrant populations not captured by the variables of our models. As 
already stated, students’ performance may be influenced not just by family factors but also by the 
culture and beliefs of the ethnic communities they belong to, and immigrant communities in Europe 
might not put much value on education. Although Table 2 shows that the difference between the 
educational attainments of the immigrant and overall populations  of the host countries is not wider 
in Europe than elsewhere, we have run a further set of regressions with the countries of origin, 
when available, or with the areas of origin, of the student, mother and father added to Model  III to 
control for these factors.  
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Results (not reported in this paper) show that there does not seem to be a ‘country of origin’ 
problem specific to Europe.  More precisely, there is no concentration of negative coefficients in 
this area, and, there is no group of origin countries or areas to which a lower performance at school 
is systematically related. The same origin countries may have negative or positive coefficients, 
depending on the destination economy. This may indicate that rather than the culture (for example, 
religion) of the ethnic groups, what matters is parents’ level of education, a factor our regressions 
control for.  The correlation between country of origin and scores is significant and negative in the 
regressions concerning Belgium (with origin countries located in East Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa), Estonia (origin: Eastern Europe), France, the Netherlands and Norway (non-Western 
European countries), but negative coefficients are also significant in regressions concerning non-
European host countries, such as New Zealand (countries of origin: in South Asia, North Africa, 
and non-Western Europe), Qatar (Middle East) and Hong Kong (non-Western Europe). 
As shown in Models I and II of Tables 4a and 4b, the percentage of missing observations is 
low (with the exception of Germany). The coefficients of these two models can be compared 
because the change in the number of observations from one to the other is nil or negligible. The 
same applies to Models III and IV, which have the same number of observations, although there are 
more missing observations than in the previous models. This may introduce a bias in coefficients, 
which should be downwards for negative coefficients and upwards for positive ones if students with 
a poorer background tend to respond less completely to the PISA Students Questionnaire. Where 
immigrants have on average a poorer background than natives, negative gaps can be expected to be 
underestimated and vice versa when immigrant students have a better background than natives.  
The variable with the most frequent missing values in our data is ‘language’. To check 
whether the results on gaps change significantly without this variable, the regressions of Models III 
and IV were rerun without it. Negative gaps widen slightly in countries where the language variable 
had a significant coefficient in Models III and IV, but general results do not change significantly.  
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Overall, this paper shows that, controlling for factors related to family background, there is a 
concentration of negative performances at school of immigrants compared to natives in the central 
area of continental Western Europe. These differences appear to be related to tracking where it is 
sharp, and to be affected that factors that are not directly related to educational institutions where 
education is comprehensive. In both cases, more than elsewhere, the performance of immigrant 
students compared to natives presents a variability between individual schools and in some cases 
within schools.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper shows that the school performance of immigrant students is significantly lower than that 
of natives in several countries. Partially confirming prior expectations on the relations between the 
immigrant gaps and the two main models of education, tracking and comprehensive, we find that 
gaps are more negative where tracking is marked and – with some relevant exceptions – that they 
are narrow or nil where education is  comprehensive or tracking is mild. These few exceptions refer 
to countries with comprehensive schools and wide and significant negative gaps. Together with 
those characterized by sharp tracking, they are located in continental Western Europe.  
The geographical concentration could be due to specific cultural traits of the immigrant 
communities, but using the available data on the home countries of immigrant students and of their 
parents, we find no relation between countries of origin and the location of negative gaps. The 
available evidence on this issue is, however, still incomplete and further data and research may be 
needed to qualify results.   
Rather, we find that in some countries of Western Europe the immigrant school gaps remain 
negative and significant even after having controlled for family background and tracking (which are 
generally both significant), and that these remaining gaps are explained by immigrants and natives 
attending different schools and (or) are significant within schools. Also in this case, further studies 
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are needed to make clear whether these findings are linked, respectively, to residential segregation 
and to discrimination at school.  
In the group of countries characterized by the more negative and significant gaps, second 
generation immigrant students often do not perform much better than first generation ones, even 
controlling for individual and family characteristics.  
Outside continental Western Europe, tracking is implemented in a milder form or schools 
are comprehensive and, in general, negative gaps are narrow or nil. Particularly in the group of 
English-speaking countries, the immigrant school gaps are either non-significant or are linked to 
family background. There, differently from the European version of the comprehensive model, 
courses are taught at different levels of difficulty.  This may represent an opportunity  for students 
disadvantaged in some disciplines but not in others, often the case among immigrants, because it 
may lead to a process of assimilation in education with patterns differentiated for each discipline. 
This mechanism of adaptation is absent both in countries with sharp tracking – where the 
educational level of courses in vocational and technical schools is lower than in academic ones - 
and in the European countries with a completely homogenous comprehensive system – where all 
courses are taught at the same level.  
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Table 1. School systems. 
First age of selection and  frequency of repeaters 
   Comprehensive 
    
Tracking 
streaming homogenous 
  AUT  [10]     
 DEU [10]  SWE 
BEL  [12]  DNK 
CHE [12]  NOR 
NDL [12]  EST 
LUX [13]  LVA 
high 
FRA [14]  ESP 
 ITA [14] HKG 
 RUS [14.5] MAC 
 PRT [15] QAT 
          
GRC [15] AUS   
IRL [15] CAN  
ISR [15] GBR  
MNE [14] NZL  
SVN [14] USA  
Frequency of  
repeaters 
low 
       
Sources: UNESCO (2006); share of repeaters: PISA 2006.  
First age of selection in square brackets.  
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Table 2. Educational attainment of overall and immigrant population aged 25+. 
Percentages  
  Immigrants Population (% Immigrants)/(%Population) 
  primary tertiary primary tertiary primary tertiary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AUS 35 40 3 28 13.6 1.5 
AUT 47 13 23 12 2.1 1.1 
BEL 62 20 17 23 3.6 0.9 
CAN 30 59 4 27 7.4 2.2 
CHE 55 19 18 19 3.1 1.0 
DEU 66 22 16 20 4.2 1.1 
DNK 45 17 32 17 1.4 1.0 
ESP° 29 19 23 18 1.2 1.0 
EST       
FRA 74 16 14 17 5.3 1.0 
GBR 34 35 27 15 1.3 2.4 
GRC° 45 15 31 15 1.4 1.0 
HKG       
IRL° 14 41 17 25 0.8 1.6 
ISR       
ITA° 53 15 26 9 2.1 1.6 
LUX 45 22 24 16 1.9 1.3 
LVA       
MAC       
MNE       
NLD 50 22 10 22 5.2 1.0 
NOR 22 29 22 25 1.0 1.2 
NZL 33 41 24 42 1.4 1.0 
PRT 60 19 45 10 1.3 1.9 
QTA       
RUS       
SVN       
SWE 34 26 13 23 2.6 1.1 
USA 38 43 2 52 18.1 0.8 
Notes: Percentages of Immigrants and of overall population, aged 25+, in primary and in tertiary education. Columns 
(5) and (6), respectively, are: column (1) divided by column (3) and column (2) divided by column (4). Data on overall 
population from Barro-Lee (2000), updated to 2006 and on Immigrants by educational attainment from Docquier and 
Marfouk (2006). 
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 Table 3. Grades and School types. 
 
 Index: (% immigrant students) / (%native students) 
 
Countries  School 1 School 2 School 3 Grade 9  Grade < 8  grade at 15 
Tracking 
2nd 
gen 
1st 
gen 
2nd 
gen 
1st 
gen  
2nd 
gen 
1st 
gen 
2nd 
gen 
1st 
gen  
2nd 
gen 
1st 
gen    
AUT 0.92 0.78 0.82 1.08 1.31 1.05 1.17 1.22 1.84 3.09 10 
BEL 0.98 0.7 0.93 1.02 2.52 6.03 1.78 1.86 3.38 7.85 10 
CHE 1.11 1.09 1.02 1.01 0.78 0.84 0.95 0.81 1.33 1.9 9 
DEU 0.5 0.52 1.21 1.17 1.27 1.26 0.99 1.05 1.91 2.34 9 
FRA 0.91 0.63 1.09 1.4 1.46 1.48 1.15 1.32 1.58 4.09 10 
GRC   0.5   3.35       9.28   7.66 10 
IRL   1.45   0.94       0.92   3.39 9 
ISR 0.94 0.69 1.16 1.77     1.45 2.63     10 
ITA   0.4   1.58   1.3   4.09   13.21 10 
LUX 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.7 1.18 1.15 1.12 1.17 1.65 1.83 10 
MNE   1.08   0.91   0.87   1.01     9 
NLD 0.59 0.63 0.91 0.79 1.89 2.26 1.34 1.46 1.97 5.35 10 
PRT 0.73 0.42 1.19 1.43 0.93   0.84 0.99 1.99 2.77 10 
RUS 0.85 0.91 1.11 1.16 1.55 0.43 1.08 1.09 1.63 1.98 10 
SVN 0.69   1.24   1.32           10 
Comprehensive                       
AUS             0.45 1.32     10 
CAN             0.57 1.09 0.33 1.06 10 
DNK             0.95 0.75 1.3 2.91 9 
ESP             1.17 1.76 1.08 1.83 10 
EST                 0.56   9 
GBR                     11 
HKG             1.02 1.62 0.86 9.99 10 
LVA                 0.92   9 
MAC             0.97 1.01 0.87 1.97 10 
NOR                     10 
NZL                     11 
QAT             1.37 0.92 0.51 0.48 10 
SWE                 1.98 5.57 9 
USA             1.3 1.59 0.52 0.81 10 
Notes: Indices are calculated by taking the proportion of immigrants in each school type and grade, the proportion of natives in each 
school type and grade and then dividing one by the other. School 1: academic; School 2: intermediate;  School 3: vocational. 
Switzerland (CHE): international students with immigrant students.  Hong Kong and Macao: no significant share of students in schools 
of types 2 and 3 
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Dependent variable: student scores in Science
2nd gen 1st gen Ad. R2 2nd gen 1st gen Ad. R2 2nd gen 1st gen Ad. R2 2nd gen 1st gen Ad. R2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
AUT -92.3 -88.7 0.10 -75.9 -68.0 0.37 1 -39.4 -31.5 0.36 -40.0 -31.3 0.57 4
(13.40) (6.66) (5.05) (2.43) (21.25) (16.53) (26.43) (8.94)
BEL -80.3 -93.2 0.09 -55.8 -36.6 0.49 # 1 -32.8 -22.8 0.49 -16.7 -17.6 0.58 12
(2.53) (1.41) (2.42) (4.82) (47.64) (10.53) (53.29) (8.25)
CHE -69.3 -94.8 0.12 -67.33 -87.6 0.28 1 -34.2 -50.3 0.28 -23.3 -39.0 0.47 8
(10.36) (7.93) (10.54) (4.92) (15.11) (42.09) (13.41) (41.73)
DEU -92.8 -76.7 0.09 -67 -46 0.45 # 17 -32.7 -17.9 0.47 -29.4 -11.5 0.62 19
(1.88) (5.42) (1.64) (3.88) (10.08) (67.04) (14.42) (60.35)
FRA -48.3 -66.8 0.03 -39.8 -35.4 0.47 # 3 -29.0 -30.8 0.48 -11.5 -30.2 0.59 9
(2.53) (2.72) (4.28) (2.70) (11.13) (7.49) (60.35) (7.41)
GRC° -49.5 0.02 10.9 0.28 2 20.2 0.33 7.9 0.45 6
(26.90) (6.90) (3.36) (12.01)
IRL° -10.1 0.00 -4.6 0.05 3 19.3 0.13 23.6 0.26 5 yes
(3.74) (2.70) (37.10) (43.35)
ISR -17.3 5.8 0.00 -14.9 17 0.04 8 -5.8 34.8 0.09 -11.4 20.3 0.35 15
(2.20) (1.58) (1.88) (1.36) (11.61) (17.48) (2.18) (8.74)
ITA° -61.1 0.01 -12.9 0.24 # 2 -20.1 0.28 -30.7 0.54 15
(1.75) (4.84) (18.02) (26.47)
LUX -66.2 -66.9 0.11 -55.2 -57.9 0.32 2 -22.1 -26.6 0.37 -24.7 -28.0 0.45 17 yes
(2.14) (1.92) (2.12) (1.77) (9.33) (30.74) (11.47) (30.61)
MNE° 24.2 0.00 21.5 0.21 3 25.4 0.23 26.0 0.29 15
(2.15) (2.50) (7.70) (5.92)
NLD -79 -67.5 0.06 -49.2 -30.3 0.58 # 2 -38.1 -15.7 0.57 -25.7 -14.6 0.65 5 yes
(3.61) (3.67) (3.72) (4.13) (23.30) (4.84) (13.01) (4.36)
PRT -37.2 -66.9 0.02 -16.3 -26.7 0.44 # 3 -22.1 -29.2 0.45 -16.7 -23.7 0.52 7
(22.00) (6.53) (12.10) (3.57) (35.06) (19.51) (32.79) (23.96)
RUS -13 -14.2 0.00 -6.3 -9.9 0.11 # 1 -4.8 -6.0 0.17 -5.5 -8.8 0.34 2 yes
(1.55) (2.80) (1.54) (3.01) (12.30) (40.62) (7.64) (43.96)
SVN° -57.4 0.03 -40.8 0.47 # 2 -22.0 0.48 -22.5 -14.1 0.63 4
(2.34) (2.74) (32.19) (25.31) (34.07)
Notes :'°': ony one immigrant generation above 3%.   Robust standard errors in brackets. In bold: signif icat at 1%, 5% or 10% levels.
#: statistically signif icant variation of coeff icients from Model I to Model II and from Model III to Model IV, at 1% level.
Table 4a: immigrant performance gaps, schooling and background. Tracking
foreign 
lang at 
home
Model III - Gap conditional to 
grade, school type and 
background
% 
miss
ing 
obse
rv.
% 
mis
sing 
obs
erv.
Coeffi
cient
s 
variati
on
Model I - Unconditional gap
Countries
Model IV - Gap conditional 
to background. School fixed 
effects
Coeff
icient
s 
variat
ion
Model II - Gap conditional to 
school type and grade
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Countries
2nd 
gen
1st gen Ad. R2 2nd gen 1st gen Ad. R2 2nd gen 1st gen Ad. R2 2nd gen 1st gen Ad R2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
AUS -1.7 -2.5 0 -4.3 -0.2 0.02 2 1.9 2.6 0.12 -2.5 -2.4 0.26 6 yes
(1.60) (4.50) (1.52) (3.50) (4.58) (7.10) (4.15) (6.37)
CAN -12.5 -21.9 0.01 -17 -21.2 0.07 4 -8.1 -15.8 0.11 -5.4 -13.9 0.27 7 yes
(1.53) (1.42) (2.28) (2.82) (2.36) (8.92) (1.39) (5.71)
DNK -85.4 -88.6 0.06 -84.1 -75.8 0.11 # 1 -36.9 -32.1 0.16 -30.1 -28.0 0.28 7
(7.30) (5.80) (7.80) (8.10) (17.03) (16.91) (29.76) (8.39)
ESP° -65.7 0.03 -37.74 0.31 # 1 -34.9 0.30 -32.9 0.42 5
(10.00) (9.80) (2.89) (5.39)
EST° -31.9 0.02 -38.3 0.09 # 2 -33.8 0.14 -3.3 0.30 # 4
(1.73) (1.55) (5.09) (12.74)
GBR -26.4 -40.8 0.01 -26.4 -40.7 0.01 3 -9.0 -16.6 0.09 -6.2 -9.7 0.30 10
(4.59) (11.32) (4.59) (11.39) (5.59) (24.98) (10.19) (16.96)
HKG 4 -25.9 0.01 3.5 20.9 0.12 1 11.3 26.5 0.16 11.5 25.2 0.48 3 yes
(1.67) (2.27) (1.70) (2.99) (19.43) (3.62) (19.01) (5.59)
LVA° -3.2 0 -4.6 0.11 3 -3.7 0.15 1.5 0.30 5
(3.45) (3.13) (4.59) (18.33)
MAC 15 -3.6 0.01 11.2 21.2 0.25 2 10.7 23.6 0.27 11.7 24.2 0.42 4
(1.44) (2.10) (0.88) (2.42) (1.12) (13.11) (2.71) (14.87)
NOR -57.6 -59.6 0.02 -57.4 -57.6 0.02 2 -28.2 -25.9 0.08 -22.7 -29.7 0.18 6 yes
(3.90) (6.10) (4.00) (5.80) (42.55) (18.56) (53.24) (18.42)
NZL -28.1 -10 0 -28.1 -9.8 0 2 -10.6 -5.8 0.11 -6.2 -11.1 0.22 11
(3.04) (1.93) (3.16) (1.46) (6.48) (8.50) (13.47) (13.09)
QAT 36.2 83.9 0.15 34.6 80.7 0.19 9 33.7 75.4 0.24 27.6 38.7 0.51 # 12
(1.32) (1.95) (1.48) (1.94) (9.01) (13.92) (18.73) (25.95)
SWE -47.6 -78.1 0.04 -49 -74.3 0.06 2 -21.5 -40.6 0.14 -18.1 -40.3 0.24 6
(5.20) (3.30) (4.80) (3.20) (7.42) (10.35) (7.86) (8.81)
USA -42.8 -57.1 0.03 -41.5 -52.9 0.12 3 -8.8 -15.4 0.16 -6.4 -15.6 0.30 6
(5.43) (9.97) (5.50) (11.21) (8.48) (54.47) (5.62) (47.52)
Notes :'°': ony one immigrant generation above 3%.   Robust standard errors in brackets. In bold: signif icat at 1%, 5% or 10% levels.
#: statistically signif icant variation of coefficients from Model I to Model II and from Model III to Model IV, at 1% level ( at 10% signif icance level in Denmark)
Table 4b: immigrant performance gaps, schooling, background and interacted variables. Comprehensive
Model III - Gap conditional 
to grade, school type and 
background
Model I - Unconditional 
gap
Model II - Gap conditional to 
school type and grade
Dependent variable: student scores in Science
% 
miss
ing
foreign 
lang at 
home
% 
mis
sing
Model IV - Gap conditional 
to background. School fixed 
effects
Coeff
icient
s 
variat
ion
Coeffi
cient
s 
variat
ion
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variables
(Intercept) 523.42 (1.99) 607.56 (1.92) 594.5 (10.00) 523.16 (1.24) 585.68 (0.66) 579.7 (5.57) 530.86 (11.02) 625.54 (2.25) 579.4 (4.97)
2nd gen. -92.29 (13.40) -75.94 (5.05) -39.4 (21.25) -80.34 (2.53) -55.76 (2.42) -32.8 (47.64) -69.32 (10.36) -67.33 (10.54) -34.2 (15.11)
1st gen. -88.69 (6.66) -67.98 (2.43) -31.5 (16.53) -93.25 (1.41) -36.62 (4.82) -22.8 (10.53) -94.84 (7.93) -87.61 (4.92) -50.3 (42.09)
grade 9 -42.56 (1.92) -41.7 (13.22) -63.95 (2.96) -60.3 (2.61) -41.7 (7.51) -29.7 (68.71)
grade 8 -116.13 (21.71) -112.5 (22.67) -128.7 (3.35) -124.4 (8.04) -101.93 (6.41) -85.9 (68.26)
school 2 -47.7 (1.76) -44.4 (10.47) -81.66 (1.35) -76.4 (1.31) -53.67 (7.96) -46.2 (49.75)
school 3 -120.48 (2.48) -114.8 (4.63) -109.72 (9.37) -104.0 (71.99) -95.39 (2.15) -79.0 (9.53)
gender -19.8 (4.63) -18.0 (2.48) -11.1 (12.42)
language other 15.8 (5.32) -30.1 (8.85)
language foreign -32.0 (22.00) -33.5 (27.27) -30.8 (19.64)
parents secondary edu. 3.2 (5.31) -8.2 (5.83) -6.0 (2.71)
parents primary edu. -31.3 (15.03) -27.3 (17.21) -30.5 (17.50)
occupHP 0.4 (0.06) 0.3 (0.11) 0.9 (0.16)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
(Intercept) 531.77 (0.95) 631.76 (2.03) 636.2 (14.99) 504.5 (0.37) 565.61 (0.75) 566.1 (19.70) 477.64 (0.97) 498.31 (1.05) 485.3 (21.26)
2nd gen. -92.82 (1.88) -67.02 (1.64) -32.7 (10.08) -48.25 (2.53) -39.84 (4.28) -29.0 (11.13)
1st gen. -76.66 (5.42) -46.03 (3.88) -17.9 (67.04) -66.82 (2.72) -35.44 (2.70) -30.8 (7.49) -49.48 26.87 10.86 (6.89) 20.2 (3.36)
grade 9 -45.23 (3.62) -42.9 (12.89) -10.78 (4.95) -13.5 (5.15) -21.02 (8.81) -16.1 (10.33)
grade 8 -98.47 (4.61) -89.9 (22.68) -55.54 (6.93) -57.9 (26.99) -95.63 (8.48) -87.5 (67.98)
school 2 -117.28 (4.16) -104.1 (18.36) -110.77 (3.30) -100.7 (6.98) -102.37 (1.69) -91.4 (27.29)
school 3 -89.49 (3.24) -79.9 (3.40) -202.24 (8.50) -182.9 (37.31)  
gender -17.2 (4.23) -17.4 (1.20) -0.4 (15.53)
language other  -57.8 (73.18)
language foreign -39.1 (53.37) 5.5 (16.03) -21.7 (23.01)
parents secondary edu. -10.0 (1.94) -9.8 (2.78) -12.1 (3.14)
parents primary edu. -43.4 (13.77) -25.4 (6.74) -40.7 (2.82)
occupHP 0.2 (0.18) 0.3 (0.40) 0.5 (0.51)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
(Intercept) 510.42 (3.63) 531.39 (3.46) 524.8 (16.42) 461.85 (2.06) 474.42 (1.50) 490.0 (16.07) 479.3 (1.35) 520.97 (0.43) 512.7 (15.63)
2nd gen. -17.29 (2.20) -14.86 (1.88) -5.8 (11.61)
1st gen. -10.06 (3.74) -4.60 (2.72) 19.3 (37.10) 5.83 (1.58) 17.04 (1.36) 34.8 (17.48) -61.08 (1.75) -12.88 (4.84) -20.1 (18.02)
grade 9 -29.23 (1.46) -27.2 (17.53) -6.80 (4.00) -8.4 (22.81) -39.9 (1.48) -39.5 (5.54)
grade 8 -118.7 (12.51) -108.9 (20.89) -51.79 (13.99) -50.4 (135.65) -131.7 (2.61) -123.7 (82.40)
school 2 -7.2 (33.17) -41.38 (3.74) -36.2 (4.16) -36.9 (1.15) -36.7 (2.57)
school 3 -94.29 (21.02) -84.6 (6.58)
gender -2.2 (6.18) -11.6 (16.32) -19.7 (4.44)
language other -34.0 (20.56) -79.9 (9.70) -6.3 (6.34)
language foreign -79.4 (20.41) -24.8 (28.03) 6.2 (55.82)
parents secondary edu. -27.8 (20.65) -38.6 (12.74) 8.8 (11.72)
parents primary edu. -55.9 (16.90) -80.1 (27.54) -12.2 (11.39)
occupHP 0.6 (0.05) 0.2 (0.28) 0.4 (0.11)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
AUT BEL
Notes:  standard errors in square brackets. ° Only one generation of immigrant students.
Model 3
Table A1.a. Tracking system. Dependent variable: student scores in Science
CHE
DEU FRA
11219
0.28
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.12
GRC°
4795
Model 1 Model 2
12021 12021
4794 4578
0.28
4891 4891 4749
0.47
8743 8742
0.48
7789
4481 3978 4575
0.37 0.36 0.09 0.49 0.49
0
IRL° ISR
43074575
0.09 0.45 0.47 0.03
4603
0.04 0.09
4442 4367 4201 4201
0.02 0.28 0.33
ITA°
0.01 0.24 0.28
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0.1
21260 18545
0.05 0.13 0
3875 212604442
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variables
(Intercept) 511.5 (0.95) 574.02 (2.82) 558.3 (9.31) 411.39 (0.78) 460.08 (3.02) 477.7 (3.94) 534.42 (2.20) 638.27 (2.09) 631.1 (21.90)
2nd gen. -66.22 (2.14) -55.17 (2.12) -22.1 (9.33) -79 (3.61) -49.17 (3.72) -38.1 (23.30)
1st gen. -66.87 (1.92) -57.88 (1.77) -26.6 (30.74) 24.19 (2.15) 21.48 (2.50) 25.4 (7.70) -67.52 (3.67) -30.31 (4.13) -15.7 (4.84)
grade 9 4.24 (3.33) -0.5 (27.16) -19.39 (1.75) -19.2 (9.53) -29.39 (3.13) -30.7 (8.12)
grade 8 -14.23 (2.98) -20.6 (9.27) -91.35 (12.84) -89.2 (161.44) 0.25 (2.57) -0.1 (33.09)
school 2 -61.74 (5.43) -55.3 (18.10) -73.82 (1.61) -72.5 (13.73) -93.86 (1.28) -89.9 (11.68)
school 3 -97.98 (3.09) -77.3 (14.74) -63.4 (5.78) -61.4 (10.13) -205.95 (1.19) -201.2 (5.57)
gender -15.1 (9.34) -15.4 (2.04) -16.9 (2.17)
language other -5.1 (15.20) -14.9 (11.30)
language foreign -37.0 (7.31) -19.6 (51.66) -26.5 (11.40)
parents secondary edu. -7.5 (32.31) -7.1 (4.47) -4.0 (15.63)
parents primary edu. -22.6 (2.92) -35.1 (13.55) -7.1 (20.58)
occupHP 0.5 (0.03) 0.0 (0.17) 0.3 (0.04)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
(Intercept) 478.54 (2.16) 536.2 (7.61) 542.1 (30.99) 481.38 (0.45) 506.92 (0.76) 502.3 (8.26) 525.48 (1.11) 589.41 (1.97) 596.7 (8.17)
2nd gen. -37.24 (21.98) -16.32 (12.13) -22.1 (35.06) -12.98 (1.55) -6.25 (1.54) -4.8 (12.30) -57.44 (2.34) -40.8 (2.74) -22.0 (32.19)
1st gen. -66.92 (6.53) -26.68 (3.57) -29.2 (19.51) -14.18 (2.80) -9.94 (3.01) -6.0 (40.62)
grade 9 -52.49 (3.13) -49.5 (12.73) -30.62 (3.00) -23.4 (33.48) -72.3 (5.76) -74.3 (81.40)
grade 8 -118.36 (2.20) -114.4 (2.06) -68.09 (3.92) -56.2 (43.87)
school 2 -30.77 (8.46) -28.0 (13.54) -16.91 (2.82) -20.6 (21.90) -89.47 (1.25) -87.2 (11.19)
school 3 -48.72 (15.36) -62.0 (104.03) -84.93 (1.98) -84.2 (24.28) -166.32 (1.99) -163.8 (11.12)
gender -17.5 (12.96) -9.3 (2.66) -20.0 (5.62)
language other -29.5 (117.14)
language foreign 0.8 (28.48) -9.3 (2.66) -29.3 (38.87)
parents secondary edu. -10.6 (23.58) -14.3 (1.55) -10.6 (13.64)
parents primary edu. -21.9 (9.95) -46.6 (30.13) -14.5 (24.68)
occupHP 0.4 (0.26) 0.4 (0.21) 0.2 (0.06)
n. obs.
adj. R 2 0.48
0.58
4786 4628
Model 2 Model 3
3790
NLD
SVN°
64865053 4960
0.02 0.44
57144744
Model 1
0.45 0 0.11 0.17
Notes:  standard errors in square brackets. ° Only one generation of immigrant students.
0.57
4787
0.03
0.06
64865714 5677 6318
0.47
0.32
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
0
3787
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
4490
LUX MNE°
PRT RUS
4302 4302
0.11 0.21
4490
0.230.37
Table A1.a. Tracking system. Dependent variable: student scores in Science (cont)
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variables
(Intercept) 529.18 (0.42) 534.16 (0.45) 503.3 (4.20) 540.9 (1.71) 549.96 (1.33) 518.4 (11.57) 502.98 (5.26) 558.96 (5.26) 538.2 (38.60)
2nd gen. -1.66 (1.58) -4.28 (1.52) 1.9 (4.58) -12.48 (1.53) -16.95 (2.28) -8.1 (2.36) -85.4 (7.32) -84.06 (7.82) -36.9 (17.03)
1st gen. -2.51 (4.46) -0.19 (3.50) 2.6 (7.10) -21.94 (1.42) -21.19 (2.82) -15.8 (8.92) -88.64 (5.81) -75.83 (8.07) -32.1 (16.91)
grade 9 -51.32 (1.66) -48.3 (1.64) -47.88 (3.04) -41.1 (5.66) -50.52 (2.35) -43.4 (42.34)
grade 8 -137.2 (4.95) -115.2 (25.24) -110.08 (6.74) -101.5 (30.46)
gender -2.8 (2.11) -6.3 (7.07) -14.3 (4.61)
language other -174.4 (7.37) -29.1 (15.78)
language foreign -16.7 (5.82) -9.6 (10.67) -39.5 (29.46)
parents secondary edu. -25.1 (5.05) -19.4 (6.91) -21.9 (25.21)
parents primary edu. -48.0 (2.63) -45.1 (41.20) -56.1 (44.15)
occupHP 0.9 (0.04) 0.8 (0.31) 0.6 (0.18)
n. obs. 4493 4493
adj. R 2
(Intercept) 493.63 (4.16) 529.68 (3.13) 539.1 (11.42) 536.79 (0.46) 597.46 (3.96) 538.2 (64.57) 519.48 (1.20) 519.48 (1.20) 475.3 (11.25)
2nd gen. -31.94 (1.73) -38.26 (1.55) -33.8 (5.09) -26.42 (4.59) -26.42 (4.59) -9.0 (5.59)
1st gen. -65.73 (9.98) -37.74 (9.84) -37.3 (11.32) -41.72 (5.96) -40.53 (6.84) -37.3 (11.32) -40.79 (11.32) -40.67 (11.39) -16.6 (24.98)
grade 9 -85.76 (1.69) -40.2 (35.64) -47.76 (3.63) -40.2 (35.64)
grade 8 -139.65 (2.65) -81.8 (46.43) -93.7 (4.44) -81.8 (46.43) -
gender -0.9 (11.27) -0.9 (11.27) -11.8 (9.07)
language other -6.9 (13.98) -6.9 (13.98) -42.3 (14.73)
language foreign -24.2 (35.94) -24.2 (35.94) -28.2 (38.56)
parents secondary edu. -6.1 (7.89) -6.1 (7.89) -11.1 (0.91)
parents primary edu. -27.2 (70.93) -27.2 (70.93) -68.1 (19.71)
occupHP 1.1 (0.18) 1.1 (0.18) 1.3 (0.15)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
(Intercept) 546.75 (1.40) 561.3 (1.01) 605.0 (32.80) 491.82 (3.08) 565.31 (3.33) 539.1 (44.68) 503.95 (0.87) 546.19 (1.76) 537.7 (4.06)
2nd gen. 3.95 (1.67) 3.55 (1.70) 11.3 (19.43) 15.04 (1.44) 11.15 (0.88) 10.7 (1.12)
1st gen. -25.89 (2.27) 20.86 (2.99) 26.5 (3.62) -4.21 (6.92) -15.6 (7.08) -23.0 (21.76) -3.59 (2.11) 21.2 (2.42) 23.6 (13.11)
grade 9 -44.98 (1.53) -42.6 (7.80) -63.39 (3.05) -59.6 (15.64) -47.86 (2.36) -48.2 (2.99)
grade 8 -104.23 (3.28) -90.4 (43.82) -128.38 (2.69) -119.3 (4.68) -97.89 (1.40) -99.3 (4.25)
gender -11.7 (3.24) 0.3 (5.06) -13.4 (3.84)
language other -5.4 (27.38) -25.0 (8.63) 14.9 (7.78)
language foreign -72.2 (15.31) -33.1 (123.93) -4.4 (9.56)
parents secondary edu. -25.9 (4.71) -13.0 (3.40) 8.1 (5.37)
parents primary edu. -47.4 (14.47) -45.2 (91.92) -2.4 (11.53)
occupHP -0.2 (0.66) 0.6 (0.49) 0.0 (0.03)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
0.16
4584
0.25 0.270.11
0.09 0.14 0.01
12751
HKG LVA°
Notes:  standard errors in square brackets. ° Only one generation of immigrant students.
4506 4596
0.11
EST° GBR
12751 11790
0.01 0.09
4756 4756 4694
0.02 0.12 0.01
0.31 0.30 0.01
Model 2 Model 3
DNK
0.03
19367 19367 18602
ESP°
0
AUS CAN
Table A32.b. Comprehensive systems. Dependent variable: student scores in Science
Model 2 Model 1
13844 13844 13370 21743
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1
0.01
0.07
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21743 21167 4207
0.12 0.16 0
4672
0.15
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variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) 493.01 (1.27) 493.24 (1.25) 449.9 (31.28) 535.98 (0.51) 536 (0.46) 501.9 (5.53) 329.62 (0.87) 338.48 (0.67) 355.8 (11.32)
2nd gen. -57.63 (3.93) -57.43 (3.96) -28.2 (42.55) -28.09 (3.04) -28.12 (3.16) -10.6 (6.48) 36.23 (1.32) 34.61 (1.48) 33.7 (9.01)
1st gen. -59.56 (6.10) -57.57 (5.84) -25.9 (18.56) -9.96 (1.93) -9.84 (1.46) -5.8 (8.50) 83.92 (1.95) 80.71 (1.94) 75.4 (13.92)
grade 9 -64.78 (8.79) -50.8 (111.82) -59.9 (128.41) -23.47 (1.05) -18.3 (4.28)
grade 8 -62.17 (3.51) -55.8 (7.39)
gender 3.3 (9.91) 3.0 (8.61) 29.6 (4.48)
language other -82.6 (43.20) -101.9 (201.41) -7.4 (2.47)
language foreign -23.9 (10.99) -41.5 (10.01) 32.1 (20.14)
parents secondary edu. -18.9 (17.33) -24.7 (7.50) -16.3 (3.10)
parents primary edu. -63.6 (25.42) -66.3 (7.35) -14.8 (6.88)
occupHP 1.0 (0.77) 1.1 (0.13) -23.47 1.05 -0.3 (0.30)
n. obs.
adj. R 2
variables
(Intercept) 512.05 (2.77) 563.27 (5.62) 492.8 (15.24) 498.86 (2.48) 509.76 (2.37) 505.6 (4.83)
2nd gen. -47.6 (5.20) -49.02 (4.82) -21.5 (7.42) -42.75 (5.43) -41.48 (5.50) -8.8 (8.48)
1st gen. -78.11 (3.33) -74.34 (3.21) -40.6 (10.35) -57.14 (9.97) -52.94 (11.21) -15.4 (54.47)
grade 9 -51.02 (6.16) -40.0 (29.37) -83.32 (1.64) -75.9 (6.15)
grade 8 -129.23 (5.40) -112.5 (25.13) -161.26 (17.13) -154.2 (18.40)
gender -1.2 (6.16) -6.8 (5.20)
language other 12.0 (67.53)
language foreign -33.2 (10.00) -29.6 (58.02)
parents secondary edu. -5.4 (15.07) -34.6 (25.40)
parents primary edu. -33.5 (4.42) -57.6 (15.63)
occupHP 1.3 (0.05) 0.4 (0.11)
n. obs.
adj. R 2 0.12 0.160.04 0.06 0.14 0.03 
Notes:  standard errors in square brackets. ° Only one generation of immigrant students.
5420 
Model 1 Model 2
4362 4362 4157 5422 
0 0.11 0.15
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Table A2.b. Comprehensive systems. Dependent variable: student scores in Science (cont.)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table A3: Variables, PISA Codebook 
immigr Status of immigration of student (categorical variable: first generation, second generation, native; intercept: native)  
language Foreign language spoken at home (categorical variable; intercept: test language)  
language other Other national language spoken at home 
parents secondary 
edu. Completed ISCED 3B, 3C  
parents primary edu. Not completed ISCED 3B, 3C  
occupHP Index of highest parental occupational status  
gender Gender of student (binary variable: intercept: male)  
grade  The grade student is in (categorical variable: intercept:  grade >9)  
school Type of school attended by the student. Categorical variable: 1 academic, 2 technical, 3 vocational. Intercept:1. 
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